## AC

Resource extraction in developing countries is influenced by neoliberalism. Corporations and states suppress environmentally-focused protest by indigenous groups with violence.

**Downey et al. 10** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

Of course, transportation technology alone does not ensure access to affordable raw materials, especially when those materials are located in other nations or in areas controlled by other groups. Thus, since World War II and the breakup of Europe’s colonial empires,4 **wealthy nations and corporations, which consume the bulk of** the world’s **natural resources** (Hawken, Lovins, & Lovins, 1999; Speth, 2005), **have relied on** a combination of mechanisms that they control, including **ideology** (**e.g., neolib**eralism; Goldman, 2005), debt (Bello et al., 1999; Clark & Foster, 2009), agricultural research institutes (Foster, 1994), export credit (Evans, Goodman, & Lansbury, 2002), political risk insurance (Moody, 2005, 2007), the WTO (Wallach & Woodall, 2004), the World Bank, and the IMF (Bello et al., 1999; Goldman, 2005), to ensure their continued access to and control over vital raw materials. Among other things, these institutions, organizations, and ideologies have worked collectively **to open** the **economies of developing nations to** corporate **investment, increase** the **flow of natural resources** from developing to developed nations**,** create new legal structures and government institutions that facilitate foreign involvement in developing nation economies, **and garner developing nation support for** corporate activities, including **resource extraction** activities, **within their borders** (Bello et al., 1999; Goldman, 2005; Harrison, 2004; Moody, 2007; Potter, 2000; Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network, 2004; Toussaint, 2005; Vorley, 2004; Wallach & Woodall, 2004). **However,** nations and **societies are not monolithic** entities, **and** regardless of whether a government willingly or unwillingly engages in specific resource extraction activities, whether these activities are organized by local or foreign companies, or whether they occur in developed or developing nations or in nations with strong or weak legal and property rights regimes, it is likely that in many cases **individuals and groups will protest**, resist, or rebel **against these activities.** For example, **protestors might be worried about local environmental degradation** or health problems that result from resource extraction activities, they might be aggrieved by any loss of livelihood that they and their community may experience as a result of these activities, or they may be forced to relocate in order to make way for resource extraction (Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network, 2004). Similarly, workers hired by resource extraction firms may protest poor working conditions, local residents may receive few of the benefits but all of the burdens associated with resource extraction activities, or **local residents may be indigenous**, colonized, **or otherwise marginalized people who resent government and outsider intrusion** into their lives (Evans et al., 2002; Gedicks, 2001; Moody, 2007). In such instances, local and **national governments, resource** extraction **firms, or rebels who control** natural **resources may** feel that they have no choice but to **use violence** or the threat of violence **to protect their** resource extraction **activities. Violent actions** and threats of violence **might include the forced relocation of local residents; the use of police**, military, or mercenary forces **to break up protests**, arrest protestors and provide mine security; **and** the **repression of local indigenous people** from whose ranks protestors have emerged or might emerge. **Violent actions might** also **include military conflict** with groups that threaten resource extraction activities and foreign military aid and training to local police and military forces. Of course, armed violence may occur even in the absence of protest. For example, forced labor may be used to decrease labor costs or because working conditions are horrendous, and forced removal may occur in the absence of protest to either forestall protest or because there is no way to extract resources with people living on or near the extraction site. In either case, violence or threatened violence will likely be necessary because most people do not want to be forced to work or leave their homes. The use or threatened **use of violence** to gain or maintain access to vital raw materials **may** also **occur in** situations in which a resource that is viewed as being critical to national survival and economic prosperity, such as oil or water, is located in **an area** controlled by others **in which** mechanisms such as **trade liberalization or structural adjustment have not effectively guaranteed permanent** supplies of or **control over the resource** (see Klare, 2001, 2004, for detailed discussions of this type of situation). In such cases, governments might resort to actions such as militarily enforced trade sanctions, counterterrorism activities, proxy wars, military threats, invasion, or providing military aid and training to local police and military forces. Finally, because land and water transport is potentially subject to piracy or military disruption, governments may devote military resources toward protecting specific resource shipments (such as U.S. protection of Kuwaiti shipping during the Iraq–Iran war in the 1980s) or providing security for roads, railroads, and naval shipping lanes (Klare, 2001, 2004).5

The Zapatistas of Mexico rebel against neoliberalism and prioritize environmental protection.

**Nail 10** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

**Zapatismo**, as a non-representational political event that **has brought hundreds of thousands** of people together **against neolib**eralism and **for** the **democratic defense of the earth, without folding to state politics**, green capitalism, or environmental bureaucracy, I believe, should be considered as an abstract machine. Like the phenomena of the revolution of 1789, the Paris Commune, and the revolution of 1917, what is singular about this event is its irreducibility to social determinism and deductive causal chains: in 1994, in Mexico, Zapatismo held no resemblance to any recognizable, legal, or legitimate thing within the present “state of affairs,” i.e., no political representation (party), no market representation, linguistic representation (their languages are not spoken or recognized by political representatives), or representation by the local indigenous leaders (Caciques). There was no causal necessity that Zapatismo should have existed, no way it could have been deduced from the domains of “rights” and “commodities” from which it emerged, and yet they “burst upon a world that denied their existence” anyway, as Zapatista scholar John Holloway says.26 **From the representational point of view of Mexican politics, the marginalized and unrepresented Zapatista**s of Chiapas **have no “legitimate” existence.** But what is most interesting about the Zapatista communities is that they do not legitimate their revolution strictly by presupposed norms based on identity (prescriptive requests for “rights,” the overthrow of the state, a new market economy, or a new ethnic nationalism), but rather affirm a self-reference or autonomy. **Instead of simply valorizing** their **difference and un-representability as such,** as Simon Tormey has argued, **the Zapatistas**, I am arguing, **have created a new form of ecopolitical evaluation that better allows them to realize** the **(self)management of forest commons**.27 Contrary to normative theories of environmental philosophy based on prescription, **the Zapatistas practice** a form of **rotational direct democracy where members take fourteen day shifts** deliberating and **facilitating** communal/**environmental matters, where they consider the ecosystem to be inseparable from who they are** as Zapatistas. As Subcomadante Marcos puts it, For a long time, this place has existed where men are Zapatistas, the women are Zapatistas, the kids are Zapatistas, the chickens are Zapatistas, the stones are Zapatistas, everything is Zapatista. And in order to wipe out the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, they will have to wipe this piece of territory off the face of the earth- not just destroy it but erase it completely, because there is always the danger of the dead down below.28 If we are to take this passage seriously, **what it means to be Zapatista is also to be the stones, trees, and animals of the** Zapatista **autonomous zones. Participatory** (as opposed to representative democracy) **and collective** (as opposed to personal or moral conscience) **decision-making** actually **is the whole ecological system speaking through** (as opposed to for) **the proper name of Zapatismo expressively**. “Zapatismo” is thus not a thing, or norm, that represents or signifies anything, but rather a singular and constantly renegotiated abstract machine.

Thus, I advocate embracing Zapatista ecopolitics in resistance to resource extraction in developing countries. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until checked in cross-ex.

Corporations and the state marginalize the ecological worldview of indigenous groups which rejects totality in favor of instinctual knowledge. This is epistemically flawed and causes violence.

**Hipwell 4** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

For Deleuze, **static identities are dangerous illusions: the real world is**, by contrast, **always fluid** and mobile**; reality is ontologically characterised by ‘difference’. This difference is not**, as it might seem, difference **between things** (an identitarian notion) **but** rather **the idea that reality is a continuum of** interplay, interpenetration and **interconnectedness** and that ‘things’ are merely intensities in this continuum, internally constituted by the interplay of different forces, and themselves interacting and interpenetrating with everything around them. In this sense, **allegedly separate entities are mutually** constitutive and **interdependent, and treating them as entirely separate** inevitably **does** intellectual and physical **violence to the world. In an ontology of difference, the world is viewed holistically**. Differential being is defined on the basis of what it is rather than what it is not. It is dynamic, not static. As Deleuze (1988, 123) puts it, ‘the important thing is to understand life, each living individuality, not as a form, or a development of form, but as a complex relation between different velocities’. While we may, for practical purposes, speak of ‘a tree’, ‘a fish’, ‘the human species’, etc., awareness of ontological difference reminds us that it is a mistake to abstract such things from their dynamic and continuous context. Prior to striation by identitarian forces, the world is made of ‘smooth space’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 474–500), or what Patton (2000, 112) has called ‘the heterogeneous space of qualitative multiplicity’. In smooth space, **diverse and unexpected interconnections may appear** and reconfigure (‘lines of flight’). **Smooth space is continually in flux; it is difficult to know intellectually** and (therefore) difficult to control. To know one’s way in the tangle of The Canadian Geographer / Le Ge´ographe canadien 48, no 3 (2004) 360 William T. Hipwell primeval forest or other ‘wild zones’ (Dalby 2001), one must have good instincts. Wisdom of the body Following early-twentieth-century philosopher Henri Bergson, Deleuze calls for the epistemological rehabilitation of intuition. He describes this intuitive epistemology as ‘transcendental empiricism’ or ‘wisdom of the body’. Prior to intellectualisation, **our instincts respond to and process** the **sensory data** received by the body **as a continuous** and multiplicitous **flow.** Thus, the way humans perceive the world through ‘wisdom of the body’ is better attuned to ontological difference (and therefore better capable of understanding smooth space) than through the intellect. This **‘libidinal epistemology’ provides us with an understanding of a** continuous, mobile, **fluid and interconnected world** (Ford and Hipwell 2001). A **shift** in focus **from identity to difference requires** a **greater reliance on the unconscious,** on **instinct and** on **knowing through the heart**. It requires, in many senses, an un-focusing. As an empiricist and materialist, Deleuze does not mean that un-focusing entails abandoning empirical knowledge gained through the representational intellect but rather augmenting it with wisdom of the body. He would argue that researchers—especially in the social realm—must come to recognise that variations and tangential relationships may often be more important than structures and causal relationships. Doel (1996, 430) advises that researchers learn ‘nomad thought’, ‘dwelling on change, becoming and inconsistency, rather than fixity, being and constancy’. Friedrich Nietzsche, a formative influence on Deleuze, made the argument for intuitive routes to knowledge in the nineteenth century. Nietzsche argued that . . . ‘being conscious’ is not in any decisive sense the opposite of what is instinctive: **most** of the **conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly guided** into certain channels **by his instinct**. (Nietzsche 1966, 11) As Deleuze puts it **The great activity is unconscious.** . . . **Consciousness is** essentially **reactive; this is why we do not know what a body can do** . . .. The real problem is the discovery of active forces without which the reactions themselves would not be forces. (Deleuze 1983, 41) Geographer David Livingstone (1992, 1–2) echoes this sentiment, noting that the myth of science as proceeding solely through ‘experimental analysis and logical rigour’ has been thoroughly dispelled (see also Saul 2001, 5). In sum, reality can only be fully grasped with the aid of wisdom of the body, which is more attuned to difference than to identity. **Wisdom of the body is** implicitly **granted epistemological status in** the **local–traditional ecological knowledge** (Lo-TEK) **employed by peripheral communities** engaged in the small-scale harvest of natural resources (see Inglis 1993; Acheson and Wilson 1996). As is discussed below, the **marginalisation of such knowledge by state and corporate managers is a key cause of many environmental problems.**

Humans are not completely independent of nature, and vice versa. This requires a rethinking of not only the human subject but how we conceive of environmental protection and resource extraction.

**Nail 10** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

Deleuze and Guattari begin their first collective work, Anti-Oedipus, with the rejection of the dualism between the supposedly autonomous spheres of nature and culture. Where industry extracts its raw materials from nature, consumes them, and then returns its refuse to nature, Deleuze and Guattari argue, following Marx, that this is not the operation of relatively separate spheres (production, distribution, consumption), but rather an activity predicated on the common structural relations of the capitalist division of labor and the concept of supposedly “fixed elements” within the overall process of profit generation. **Human beings do not autonomously extract raw materials** from nature**, nor do they autonomously decide to “save nature”** from unsustainable extractions or toxic waste disposals. **While** there are, of course, **human agents** who **speak of** the **“rights of nature” and “sustainable extraction,”** their very ability **to conceive of environmental protection in terms of “rights,” “labor,” and “value” is conditioned by** an advanced technoscientific coordination of research, organization, and **green capitalist industry. For this reason** Deleuze and Guattari can say, We make no distinction between man **[human] and nature**: the human essence of nature and the natural essence of man **become one** within nature **in** the form of **production** or industry, just as they do within the life of man as a species. Industry is then no longer considered from the extrinsic point of viewof utility, but rather from the point of view of its fundamental identity with nature as production of man and by man. **Not** man **[human] as** the **king of creation, but** rather as **the being** who is **in intimate contact with** the profound **life of all forms** or all types of being. **Human** activity and **“reason” is thus conditioned on an enormous matrix of non-human activities** (economic, biological, and technological structures, etc.), just as nature is conditioned by an enormous network of human activity. To assert an independence of one from the other is sheer abstraction. **Deleuze and Guattari’s conclusion is thus that there are only processes of mutual production** that are **neither strictly human, nor** strictly **natural,** but both, that is, artificial. Insofar as artifacts and technology are a mix between human activity and natural objects, Deleuze and Guattari claim that **all processes of production** (insofar **as they** too **are always natural/human**) **are machines.** And “every machine is a machine connected to another machine,” and **the multiplicity of machines connected up** with one another **forms** the “Mechanosphere” of **the earth** (AO 12/6). As Guattari insists, “We might just as well rename environmental ecology machinic ecology, because Cosmic and human praxis has only ever been a question of machines.”11

Transcendental ethical norms falsely assume human independence from nature. Ethics must enable a shared condition that facilitates creative expressions of subjectivity in that it can be constantly re-invented. This is Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the abstract machine. **Nail 10** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

Where one might locate the concept of **an ethical “norm**,**”** “law,” or “condition” in environmental philosophy that allows disparate human voices to come to a common prescriptive agreement on a dispute, Deleuze and Guattari instead propose the alternative concept of an “abstract machine.”A norm does not describe the world the way it “is,” but how it “ought” to be. A norm **is** thus **a transcendent element intended by an autonomous** form of consciousness or sovereign **state unhindered by existential bias.** For instance, the prescriptive value of “ecological diversity” is defined in conceptual or legal terms, prior to or independent from any specific thing that might be described as realizing that value. Something either realizes biodiversity and is right or it does not and it is wrong. “Athing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise,” as Aldo Leopold asserts in his land ethic.23 Difference is thus only a difference from the same, e.g., the norm which represents the independent unity of the diverse. **Opposed to this, the abstract machine is an event or shared condition for action** and evaluation only insofar as it is **immanently transformed by** the **concrete elements that realize** and differentiate **it** . There is thus a “coadaptation” or “reciprocal presupposition” of the two that allows for their participatory transformation.24 **The event** thus **changes in nature each time there are** “reconversions subjectives actuelles” (actually occurring **subjective redeployments**) of it (DRF 217/236). Subsequently, according to Deleuze and Guattari, the abstract machine is absolutely singular and unable to be deduced from either history or introspection. In historical phenomena such as the revolution of 1789, the Commune, the revolution of 1917, there is always one part of the event that is irreducible to any social determinism, or to causal chains. Historians are not very fond of this point: they restore causality after the fact. Yet **the event itself is** a splitting off from, a breaking with causality; it is a bifurcation, a lawless deviation, **an unstable condition that opens up a new field of the possible**. (DRF 215/233) **The abstract machine** is not deducible because it **is the condition for** deduction, description, and **prescription itself**: it is a more primary evental commitment. **This machine is abstract in the sense that is not a thing among other things, but also real** (vrai-abstrait), insofar **as it** is a condition that **allows for** the appearance of “new space-times” and **new subjectivities antagonistic to representation and power** (P 233/172).25 However, while **it** may not be a thing, the abstract machine **is still marked by a** singular and asignifying **proper name**, date, and image, **like** the names of military operations or the names of **hurricanes**, as Deleuze and Guattari say (MP 51/28, 322– 323/264). **These names do not represent**, symbolize, or refer to **anything at all. Rather, they are spoken through**. As a self-referencing and autonomous event **independent from political representation, the abstract machine allows for** the **shared expression** and conjunction **of** the various **heterogenous elements that speak and exist through it** (MP 177–178/142).

The Zapatistas are an abstract machine that rejects transcendental norms and view their identity as inseparable from nature, prioritizing sustainability over neoliberal destruction of the environment. **Nail 10** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

The procedure of counting the affects of the situation thus decides what can or will be done in the assemblage. There are no universal ends or values that inhere in things themselves, only their immanent capacities to be assembled and reassembled in a continually renegotiated and expressive machinic assemblage or relation. Insofar as the Zapatistas practice such a continual and affective renegotiation of their ecological assemblage, without drawing on the concepts or practices of state-based or universal environmental rights, they effect a concrete machinic assemblage. That is, the **Zapatista communities** practice a form of collective valorization that **refer**s **back not to** the **sovereignty of the state,** or **the intrinsic value of nature, or any other pre-given teleology, but** to **the immanent act of determining in each case what their collective ecological body is capable of**. Assembled in a heterogeneous mix of NGOs, diverse indigenous traditions, and in ternational influence, **the Zapatista**s have had to learn how to manage the environment. This **commitment takes the form of several specific** forest management **affects: to be able to cultivate the land by the no-till method,** to be able to **ban slash and burn practices,** to be able to **take a limited amount of trees from the forest** or be penalized by having to plant and care for two more for every one taken in excess, **and** to be able to **ban agrochemical use. As a Montes Azules resident explains, “**we have been accused of destroying the jungle. But **we as indigenous people** are the true guardians of the environment, we **live together with the jungle. If the jungle dies, we die with it**.”32 **The Zapatistas do not speak for the forest, because** they are the forest, or rather, **their life is an affect of the forest**, “to be Zapatista in the Lacandon.” Their political practices express the life of the forest and exist as so many affects within its collection. Even their relations of production are owned in common and practiced sustainably. The workers’ cooperatives (honey, coffee, textiles, etc.) in Zapatista territory are based on collective or common (not private, or public) property, worker control, and self-management. While Zapatismo may have its flaws, **the spirit of these institutions** (the schools, the hospitals, the homes, the farming, etc.) **is**, as Guattari would say, to set up structures and devices that establish a totally different kind of contact. A kind of selfmanagement or **self-organization** of a set of problems **which** does not start from a central point that arranges elements, inserts them into a control grid, or establishes an agenda, but that, on the contrary, **allows** the **various singular processes to attempt a rhizomatic unfolding.** This is very important, even if it doesn’t work.33 Zapatismo is thus a struggle for the creation of a maximum of participation, both human and natural, in achieving an ecological “self-management conceived outside the criteria of a formal democracy that has proven to be sterile,” as Guattari puts it (MRB 391).

Generic ecology kritiks rely on transcendental norms which perpetuate a totalizing binary between humans and nature.

**Nail 10** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

Deleuze and Guattari’s environmentalism, according to Bernd Herzogenrath, has the aim of elaborating a “generalized ecology of complex material systems, without falling into the trap of the Cartesian dualism of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ that is still operative in much of the mainstream ecological/ecocritical approaches.” 6 And according to Mark Hasley, the author of **Deleuze** and Environmental Damage, one of the strengths of this growing literature is that it **has been able to**, for the most part, **avoid** some of the typical **monolithic approaches** found **in contemporary environmental philosophy (the irresponsible consumer monolith** under liberal ecology**, the capitalist monolith** under ecomarxism**, the patriarchal monolith** under ecofeminism**, the hierarchical monolith under deep ecology, and the domination monolith under social ecology**). Each of these approaches, Halsey claims, shares a certain theoretical drive toward totality, **each**, **“knows** the **key variables ‘causing’** social and **environmental ruin but also has implicit** within it the makings of **a comprehensive**, indeed transcendental **solution.” These modernist** environmental **projects privilege transcendental unities** (subject, object, Nature) **over immanent processes** (individuals, multiplicities, flows of matter-energy)**. They** seek to establish universal grounds from which to legitimate programs of ecological recuperation (laws of Nature, God, social justice, rational stewardship), **posit teleologies for** the permanent **resolution of environmental conflicts** (sustainability, anarchism, ecosocialism)**, and end up reestablishing binary oppositions** (culture/ nature, men/women, science/opinion, capitalism/communism, ecologically significant/ ecologically insignificant).8

## Theory Preempts

Underview – the aff does not have to defend a policy option.

1. Critically analyzing the resolution is key to textual consistency with the word “Resolved.” **Merriam Webster 03** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

**Definition of RESOLVE**

transitive verb

1 obsolete : dissolve, melt

2 a : break up, separate <the prism resolved the light into a play of color>; also : to change by disintegration

b : **to reduce by analysis** <resolve the problem into simple elements>

c : **to** distinguish between or **make** independently **visible adjacent parts of**

d : **to separate** (a racemic compound or mixture) **into** the two **components**

2. Err aff on theory because of neg side bias.

3. Case outweighs and turns theory. Parameters on critical education prop up neoliberalism. **Giroux 5** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

In spite of the professional pretense to neutrality, **academics** in the field of cultural studies **need to do more** pedagogically **than simply teach students how to argue and question.** Students need much more from their educational experience. Democratic societies need educated citizens who are steeped in more than the skills of argumentation. And it is precisely this democratic project that affirms the critical function of education and refuses to narrow its goals and aspirations to methodological considerations. As Amy Gutmann (1999) argues, **education is always political because it is connected to** the acquisition of **agency**, the ability to struggle with ongoing relations of power, **and is a precondition for creating informed** and critical **citizens** who act on the world. This is not a notion of education tied to the alleged neutrality of the academy or the new conservative call for "intellectual diversity" but to a vision of pedagogy that is directive and interventionist on the side of producing a substantive democratic society. This is what makes critical pedagogy different from training. And it is precisely the failure to connect learning to its democratic functions and goals that provides rationales for pedagogical approaches that strip critical and democratic possibilities from what it means to be educated.

Cultural studies theorists and educators would do well to take account of the profound transformations taking place in the public sphere and reclaim pedagogy as a central element of cultural politics. In part, this means once again recognizing, as Pierre Bourdieu (2003) has insisted, that the "power of the dominant order is not just economic, but intellectual—lying in the realm of beliefs"(p. 66), and it is precisely within the domain of ideas that a sense of utopian possibility can be restored to the public realm. Such a task suggests that **academics** and other cultural workers **actively resist the ways** in which **neolib**eralism **discourages teachers and students from becoming critical intellectuals by turning them into human data banks.** Educators and other cultural workers need to build alliances across differences, academic disciplines, and national boundaries as part of broader efforts to develop social movements in defense of the public good and social justice. No small part of this task requires that such groups make visible the connection between the war at home and abroad. If the growing authoritarianism in the U.S. is to be challenged, it is necessary to oppose not only an imperial foreign policy, but also the shameful tax cuts for the rich, the dismantling of the welfare state, the attack on unions, and those policies that sacrifice civil liberties in the cause of national security.

4. It’s predictable – my aff is core of environmental phil topic lit.

5. Exclusion of this aff is a form of privileging statist discourse. This polemicism destroys fairness and meaningful education.

**Foucault 71** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

Q. Why is it that you don't engage in polemics? In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the questions is merely exercising the right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more infonnation, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, etc. As for the person answering the questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion itself; by the logic of his own discourse he is tied to what he has said earlier! and by the acceptance of dialogue he is tied to the questioning of the other. Questions and answers depend on a game-a game that is at once pleasant and difficult-in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of the dialogue. **The polemicist**, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the person he **confronts** is **not a partner in the search for the truth, but** an adversary, **an enemy** who is wrong, who is harmful and **whose** very **existence constitutes a threat.** For him, then, **the game does not consist of recognizing this person as** a subject **having the right to speak, but** of **abolishing him**, as interlocutor, **from** any possible **dialogue**; and his final objective will be, not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth, but to bring about the triumph of the just cause [s]he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied. Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for the truth. Very schematically, it seems to me that today we can recognize the presence in polemics of three models: the religious model, the judiciary model, and the political model. As in heresiology, polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ig­ nored, or transgressed; and it denounces this negligence as a moral failing; at the root of the error, it finds passion, desire, interest, a whole series of weaknesses and inadmissible attach­ ments that establish it as culpable. As in judiciary practice, **polemics allows for no possibility of** an **equal discussion:** it ex­ amines a case; it isn' t dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the in­ fraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the polemicist tells the tru/ th in the form of his judgment and by virtue of the authority he ha� conferred on himself. But **it is the political model that is** the **most powerful today. Polemics** defines alliances, recruits par­ tisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it **establishes the other as an enemy**, an upholder of opposed interests, **against which one must fight until the moment this enemy** is defeated and **either surrenders or disappears.** Of course, the reactivation, in polemics, of these political, judiciary, or religious practices is nothing more than theater. One gesticulates: anathemas, excommunications, condemna­ tions, battles, victories, and defeats are no �ore than ways of speaking, after all . And yet, in the order of discourse, they are also ways of acting which are not without consequence. There are the sterilizing effects: Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic? And how could it be otherwise, given that here the interlocutors are incited, not to advance, not to take more and more risks in what they say, but to fall back continually on the rights that they claim, on their legitimacy, which they must defend, and on the affirmation of their innocence? There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics war, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one's killer instinct as possible. But **it is** really **dangerous to make anyone believe that he can gain access to** the **truth by such paths**, and thus to validate, even if in a merely symbolic form, the real political practices that could be warranted by it. Let us imagine, for a moment, that a magic wand is waved and one of the two adversaries in a polemic is given the ability to exercise all the power he likes over the other. One doesn't even have to imagine it: one has only to look at what happened during the debates in the USSR over linguistics or genetics not long ago. Were these merely aberrant deviations from what was supposed to be the correct discussion? Not at all: they were the real consequences of a polemic attitude whose effects ordinarily remain suspended.

6. Gutcheck against dumb theory. Competing interps leads to a race to the bottom where every round comes down to theory. Intervention is inevitable in blippy theory debates.

7. The aff is a prerequisite to politics. **Zalewski 2k** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

A typical postmodern claim is that power is not something that is simply or only repressive. In keeping with a desire to dismantle dualistic thinking, postmodernists refuse to perceive power as fundamentally opposed to resistance, hence the intertwined phrase; power/resistance. Indeed, the idea that there is a monolithic power ‘out there’, whether that is patriarchy, racism or capitalism, can lead to a sense of fatalism and despair, which is hardly the best way to achieve emancipatory ends, postmoderns might argue. This links into the notion of productive power introduced earlier, which implies that the persistent battle over the meanings of things will inevitably foster new forms of resistance and new meanings emerge from this. The battles over the words 'queer' and 'nigger\* serve as good examples of this. The consistent postmodern **emphasis on** disputing meanings and **displacing traditional ideas** and values, inevitably **leads to a questioning** and dishevelling of modernist definitions and certainties about **what counts as politics.** This imposition of the authority of correct meaning is something that postmodernists are keen to expose. Postmodernists also resist the idea that their views of the subject and epistemology lead to an inability to be political or do politics. If we think of a specific postmodern method, deconstruct ion, we can understand it as something that questions the terms in which we understand the political, rather than an abandonment of the political. Surely, postmodernists argue, questioning what counts as politics is a political act? **Rethinking what the political is can allow a** whole **range of** differences of **opinions to appear.** Additionally, rather than concentrating on the 'why' of things, **postmodernists** prefer to focus on effects. So instead of asking. 'Why are women oppressed?', postmodernists **are more likely to ask questions about the effects of particular practices.**

8. I’m reasonable. I have an advocacy to link disads to. Neg could link or impact turn the case and kritik the aff.

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